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Abstract
This article analyses the formation of a new global network, the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy (GCoM),
by two existing initiatives, the EU-based Covenant ofMayors and the UN-supported Compact ofMayors.While this merger
of two transnational networks provides evidence for the increased coordination and standardisation of transnational mu-
nicipal climate action, this remains a contentious and incomplete process. The article identifies different modes of transna-
tional climate governance that have contributed to conflict between the founding networks and zooms in on the role of
municipal climate data. Using empirical evidence, it analyses the contested politics of municipal climate data, including
the role of the Global Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventories (GPC) as a standard tool, the
definition of a common target, and the inclusion of financial actors. Concerns over the reshaping of public-private bound-
aries and the possible commodification of public data are identified as major obstacles for the (EU) Covenant of Mayors,
which consequentially seeks to remain as independent as possible within the new GCoM. Data politics emerges as a cru-
cial factor for the future direction of transnational municipal climate policy and the ongoing processes of standardisation
and coordination.
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1. Introduction: Transnationalising Municipal Climate
Action
Non-state actors have gained increasing recognition in
global climate policy in recent years (Fuhr & Hickmann,
2016; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2015). The decision to
adopt the Paris Agreement for the first time explicitly
“welcomes the efforts of all non-Party stakeholders to
address and respond to climate change” (United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change [UN-
FCCC], 2016, p. 19). The international process has taken
a “shift away from Kyoto-style top-down regulations”
towards a “decentralized, bottom-up process of volun-
tary pledges” (Falkner, 2016, p. 1114). Non-state ac-
tors are a key feature of this “new catalytic and facili-
tative climate regime” (Hale, 2016, p. 13) and seek to
actively intervene in the global arena (Bulkeley et al.,
2014, p. 1). Transnational climate governance (TCG) con-
sists of activities undertaken by “stakeholders other than
States that are party to the UNFCCC”, including cities, re-
gions, corporations, civil society groups, and investors
(Chan, Brandi, & Bauer, 2016, p. 240). While cities and
city networks have long been vocal stakeholders of TCG
(Bulkeley, Castán Broto, & Edwards, 2012), an increas-
ing degree of coordination and standardisation ofmunic-
ipal responses to climate change has been observed re-
cently (Bulkeley, 2015). The formation of the new Global
Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy (GCoM) is
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a prime example of this trend. In January 2017, the EU-
based Covenant of Mayors1 and the UN-supported Com-
pact of Mayors formally joined forces under the um-
brella of the GCoM. However, the merger remains a
contentious and incomplete process. This article asks
whether the politics of standardisation inherent in this
merger are also responsible for the difficulties encoun-
tered. It uses empirical evidence: participant observa-
tion at the COP 21, document analysis and interviews.2
Section 2 scrutinises the different political modes devel-
oped by the Covenant of Mayors and the Compact of
Mayors. The Covenant of Mayors has focused on estab-
lishing a new TCG structure which links municipalities
to a common target for emission reductions, whereas
the Compact of Mayors has developed a data-based
approach to municipal climate action, building on the
Global Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas
Emission Inventories (GPC) introduced as a standard tool.
Section 2.3 discusses these different political modes in
relation to the formation of the GCoM. Section 3 then
zooms in on conflicts over the politics of standardization
that emerged in the negotiations about the GCoM. It
analyses the role of municipal climate data by looking
at discussions about the future use of the GPC by the
GCoM, the inclusion of financial actors, and the sugges-
tion to define a common target. In the conclusion, con-
cerns over the reshaping of public-private boundaries
are identified as the main obstacle for further integra-
tion, most visible in concerns over the possible commod-
ification of public data voiced by the Covenant ofMayors,
which consequentially seeks to remain as independent
as possible within the GCoM.
2. Conflicting Modes of Transnational Climate Action
2.1. The Covenant of Mayors: Multi-Level Climate
Governance in Practice
The Covenant of Mayors was launched by the European
Commission in 2008 to foster the implementation of sus-
tainable energy policies at local authority level. It is man-
aged through the Covenant of Mayors Office (CoMO) by
a consortium of European city networks (Energy Cities,
CEMR, Climate Alliance, EUROCITIES and FEDARENE) act-
ing as supporting members, with funding provided by
the Commission. Signatories commit to meet the goals
of the EU common climate and energy policies as ini-
tially defined by the 2020 Climate and Energy Package.
Since 2015, signatories have committed to achieving at
least a 40% reduction in CO2 emissions by the year 2030,
as agreed upon in the EU 2030 Framework for Climate
and Energy (Covenant of Mayors [CoM], 2015a). Kona et
al. (2016, p. 39) estimate the emission reductions result-
ing from these commitments as being 254Mt CO2-eq by
2020. Commitments are reported in the form of Sustain-
able (Climate) Actions Plans (SEAP/SECAP); failure to sub-
mit these plans leads to membership suspension.
The CoM “despite its name, was never just a
covenant of mayors” (Interview Callestere, 4 December
2016)—because the involvement of territorial and re-
gional authorities has been crucial to coordinate and sup-
port cities and municipalities. The Covenant of Mayors,
therefore, claims to be “built upon a unique multi-level
governance model” (CoM, 2015a). By putting multi-level
governance into practice, the Covenant of Mayors has
produced new relationships:
The provinces and regions have found a new role
through the Covenant of Mayors and developed it fur-
ther. They discovered a new way of working with the
municipalities that did not exist before....For these
institutions, the Covenant of Mayors is an asset as
well, because it gave them possibilities they did not
have before. And [now] they speak with municipali-
ties about investments, about street lightening, urban
planning, traffic, energy policy, sanitation. And they
do not speak with one municipality separately, but
with hundreds of municipalities at the same time. (In-
terview Gheorghe, 28 June 2016)
Stimulating such multilevel practices of knowledge ex-
change and administrative support, the Covenant of
Mayors has the larger vision of being a “mainstream EU
policy instrument” (CoM, 2015a). In this vein, it is defined
as an explicitly political tool with far-reaching effects:
It is neither a programme nor a project but a politi-
cal endeavour, with Mayors putting the new EU com-
mitment to the approval of their municipal councils. It
encourages multi-level cooperation between various
government levels, from small villages to provinces,
regions, national bodies and EU institutions. It com-
bines bottom-up legitimacy with institutional credibil-
ity. (CoM, 2015b)
These mechanisms for assuring democratic legitimacy
and cooperation between various administrative levels
produce multi-level governance in practice (Bulkeley &
Betsill, 2013). Through these practices, a shared under-
standing of the Covenant of Mayors as being “bottom-
up” has emerged among the member community, even
though it was initiated from the top, by the European
Commission. Understood as forging productive relations
between levels of governance, the Covenant of Mayors
puts the central principles of European governance—
subsidiarity and multi-level governance—into practice.
However, the foundation of the Compact of Mayors in
2014 triggered internal discussions within the Covenant
of Mayors regarding whether it should also be de-
veloped into an explicitly international initiative, “be-
1 In order to avoid confusion, “Covenant of Mayors” will be used to denominate the initiative that was founded under this name in 2008, and renamed
“Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy” in 2015 (CoM, 2015a).
2 The pseudonyms of the interview partners are found in the Annex.
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cause it became clear, if the [European] Commission
doesn’t do it, others will be doing it” (Interview Ghe-
orghe, 28 June 2016).3 In 2015, the Climate Alliance
network—a Covenant supporter—suggested to “export
the Covenant worldwide” (Climate Alliance, 2015, p. 5).
The formation of the GCoM, however, has been fostered
mainly by the Compact ofMayors and has confronted the
Covenant of Mayors with a decidedly different approach
to transnational climate policy.
2.2. The Compact of Mayors: A Data Approach to
Transnational Municipal Climate Action
The Compact of Mayors was founded at the 2014 UN
Climate Summit by Michael R. Bloomberg, UN Special
Envoy for Cities and Climate Change and former Mayor
of New York City, in cooperation with the city networks
C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40), Local Govern-
ments for Sustainability (ICLEI), the United Cities and Lo-
cal Governments (UCLG), and the United Nations Human
Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). 621 cities have
committed to the Compact of Mayors prior to the start
of 2017 which represents “6.72% of the total global pop-
ulation”, according to its website. The Compact of May-
ors has been laid out as an explicitly global initiative.
Its ambition to claim global leadership in municipal cli-
mate action was underlined in 2015 by Ban-Ki Moon’s
call for all cities in the world to join the Compact of May-
ors (Bloomberg Philanthropies, 2015b). The Compact fol-
lows a four-step approach to compliance in which cities
sign the Compact, conduct an emission inventory using
the Global Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse
Gas Emission Inventories (GPC), then define an individ-
ual target and finally work out an action plan to reach it.
Inventories and commitments have to be publicly shared
(Compact of Mayors, 2015). Signatories who have ac-
complished one of the four steps can keep their status
even if they fail to reach the next step, e.g. signing the
Compact of Mayors, but not conducting an emission in-
ventory. The Compact of Mayors has not prescribed a
common target; signatories choose their commitment as
well as the baseline year of their emission inventory. In
November 2016, 596 commitments made by Compact
cities equalled nearly one billion tons of greenhouse gas
emissions savings annually by 2030 (Global Covenant of
Mayors [GCoM], 2016b).
The GPC is a tool for the standardisation of munic-
ipal emission data which has been developed by the
founders of the Compact of Mayors (World Resources In-
stitute, C40, & ICLEI, 2015). Reference to the GPC under-
lines the political ambition of the Compact of Mayors to
provide better recognition and funding opportunities for
city-level climate action by introducing a “single, consis-
tent metric for city climate impact” (Compact of Mayors,
n.d.). The reporting mechanism is said to make sure that:
everyone in theworld can understandwhat is happen-
ing in their city, and they’re all using the samemetrics
so that at the end of the day, we can add up every-
thing from every compliant city and understand just
how important city action is. (IISD, 2015)
This argument asserts that a common metric for urban
emission data directly translates into a measurement
of urban climate action–a strong political argument for
transnationalmunicipal climate policy based on emission
measurement and management: “If you can’t measure
it, you can’t manage it and you can’t fix it”, as Michael R.
Bloomberg expressed on Twitter (21 January 2014). The
GPC should also facilitate private sector investment:
For the first time, the Compact will standardize the
way city climate data is reported, establishing a uni-
versal approach to data collection. The data can be
aggregated to highlight the collective impact of city
actions, which will increase global and investor confi-
dence. (Compact of Mayors, 2015)
This ambition is evidence to both the increasing focus
on standard schemes and to the rising activity of pri-
vate actors in TCG as observed by Roger, Hale and An-
donova (2017). It also shows the ongoing blurring of
the public-private boundary in the practices of transna-
tional municipal climate action (Castán Broto & Bulkeley,
2013). The Compact of Mayors is administered and, in
the main, funded by Bloomberg Philanthropies, a char-
itable foundation created by Bloomberg to bundle his
personal and corporate giving. Its “unique data-driven
approach to global change” is attributed to Bloomberg’s
“experience as an entrepreneur and a champion of inno-
vation” (Bloomberg.org Group, 2017). Summing up, the
Compact ofMayors can be characterised as a player with
global aspirations, consolidating TCG with reference to
the standardisation ofmunicipal emission data. The Com-
pact of Mayors now brings this agenda to the GCoM, in-
cluding its objective to promote the GPC as a standard
protocol for cities.
2.3. Visions for the GCoM: Cities, Mayors and the
Production of Transnational Authority
The Covenant of Mayors and the Compact of Mayors
have established different practices for producing author-
ity which they both brought to the GCoM negotiation ta-
ble. The Covenant of Mayors claims to have built a new
governance model that binds cities directly to European
climate policy. Since it received its mandate from the Eu-
ropean Commission (and thereby indirectly also from the
3 Regardless of the link to EU policy, many of the more than 6,000 member communities are from non-EU countries, located in the Eastern and Southern
neighbourhood, or as far away as Argentina or New Zealand. Considerations to actively enlarge the initiative beyond the EU could further build on the
experience of the European Commission with two earlier projects that supported cities in Eastern and Southern neighbourhood countries of the EU to
join the Covenant of Mayors, CoM-East and CES-MED (CoM, 2016b).
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EUmember states), itmakes a claim to “delegated author-
ity…ultimately derived from the state” (see Green, 2014,
p. 7). The Covenant of Mayors continues to draw upon
the political and institutional authority of the EU, even
in the process of designing structures for the GCoM. A
newly founded European Covenant of Mayors Board will
oversee the former Covenant ofMayors signatories in the
shape of a Regional European Covenantwithin the GCoM.
The board should “reaffirm the initiative as a unique po-
litical movement steered by mayors”, aiming to further
facilitate the “dialogue between the European Covenant
community and the EU institutions” (CoM, 2017).
The Compact of Mayors defines the agency of cities
in a more direct way since it does not emphasise their re-
lation to any larger structure. Instead, it builds strongly
on the idea of mayors and their networks as “global
governors” (Avant, Finnemore, & Sell, 2010). Barber
(2013, p. 11) argues that transnational municipal net-
works (TMN) are often created by strong leaders such as
Michael R. Bloomberg building on a “pragmatic, problem-
solving” approach. The symbolic value of (mayoral) lead-
ership implied in the “Bloomberg approach” is show-
cased by a video documenting the Paris Climate Summit
for Local Leaders held during the COP 21 in 2015. It ar-
gues that “mayors are being closer to the people, and
closer to the ground, and less political” (Bloomberg Phi-
lanthropies, 2015a). This statement (voiced by Compact
of Mayor celebrity guest Robert Redford) feeds into a
discourse about cities being more effective and action-
oriented than states.
This provides a stark contrast to understanding cities
as strong players exactly because they are integrated into
different levels of politically legitimised governments.
The European Commission representative insists that
mayors are indeed political actors, and that “one of the
differences between mayors and national governments
is that the mayors try to work in a very political way in
cooperation, while the national governments try to work
in competition” (Callestere, 4 December 2016). His vision
of the GCoM is that cities and subnational governments
“all over the world are acting as smoothers in the rela-
tions between national governments…[in] an initiative
that is making of climate change the best for peaceful
cooperation. Instead of as is the case now, a vector for
conflict” (Callestere, 4 December 2016). Callestere sees
this vision of cooperation endangered by the figure of
Bloomberg himself, whom he characterises as “a very
competitive guy”—in his business approach and during
his tenure asMayor of NewYork City. Barber (2013, p. 25)
argues in the same vein when describing Bloomberg’s
“business approach to problem-solving”:
He’s all business and not enough politics….Bloomberg
incarnates the idea that mayors are practical rather
than ideological, bridging politics and business with a
non-politics of practical science andnumbers….As a re-
sult, Bloomberg trades in successful outcomes rather
than in democratic legitimacy. (Barber, 2013, p. 26)
Possibly “changing the terms of the debate” (Green,
2014, p. 20), the establishment of new modes of action
by a powerful actor such as the Special Envoy for Cities
and Climate Change Michael R. Bloomberg has the po-
tential to shape the future form of TCG. Municipal cli-
mate data plays a particularly important role in the on-
going standardisation of transnational municipal climate
action (Bulkeley, 2015). As shown in section 2.2, it has al-
ready featured prominently in the strategies of the Com-
pact of Mayors. It is therefore not surprising that data is-
sues have emerged as crucial points of discussion in the
negotiations over the merger. The following section will
focus on the contested role of municipal climate data in
the formation of the GCoM.
3. The Formation of the GCoM and the Politics of
Standardising Municipal Climate Data
In the process of forming the GCoM, significant strug-
gles over the politics of municipal climate data have be-
come evident. They occur in the context of a develop-
ing discourse that reclaims more visibility for urban cli-
mate policy on the international stage by reference to
municipal emission data. Bulkeley criticises the increas-
ing dominance of accounting approaches which rely on
“a model of urban climate governance in which growing
evidence (e.g. on emissions and on risks) informs a pol-
icy agenda…that can be readily accounted for and ver-
ified” (Bulkeley, 2015, p. 1408). This model of transna-
tional municipal climate governance is built on the pro-
duction of comparable data, and hence the introduc-
tion of standard tools for accounting municipal emis-
sions. Higgins and Larner insist that “the variety of tech-
niques and practices—such as standards, benchmarking,
auditing systems and forms of accounting” that enable
transnational governance demand critical attention by
social scientists (2010, p. 9). Some form of standardis-
ation is the prerequisite for almost any social, legal or
economic interaction or political decision-making. Lamp-
land and Star argue that since “standardization is consid-
ered to be a necessary technique designed to facilitate
other tasks…the process of standardization is both a hid-
den and a central feature of modern social and cultural
life” (2009, p. 10). Standards are not intrinsically good or
bad; however, their proliferation reflects latemodern po-
litical rationalities and potentially privileges technocratic
approaches. Standardisation is a social practice, a tech-
nology of governing (Higgins & Larner, 2010). Mattli and
Büthe describe the first mover advantage evident in the
introduction of new standards, where “first movers set
the international standards agenda, and laggards, or sec-
ond movers, pay the switching costs” (2011, p. 4). The
case study presented here concentrates on the dynamic
processes of agenda-setting as a reconfiguration of TCG
in which the standardisation of municipal emission ac-
counting emerges as a central issue.
Not merely a technocratic solution, municipal emis-
sion accounting is also a specific approach to transna-
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tional governance. Bulkeley et al. (2014) point to the pro-
liferation of emission reporting standards across private
and public actors, arguing that such “take-up by other in-
stitutions of TCCG [transnational climate change gover-
nance] rules and practices is also a useful way to think
about the effects (or even effectiveness) of TCCG initia-
tives” (Bulkeley et al., 2014, p. 157) in a more proce-
dural way, which is interested into the general reconfig-
uration of transnational climate action. Importantly, in
the processes and practices of standardising TCG, “taken-
for-granted dichotomies such as global and local, state
and market, public and private…emerge out of complex
articulations between actors in multiple locations” (Hig-
gins & Larner, 2010, p. 10). This mirrors the observation
by Bulkeley and Schroeder (2011) that such attributes
should not be treated as essential properties since pri-
vate actors increasingly take over public functions and
public actors use private market mechanisms.
This means that standardisation processes them-
selves are productive; they produce and reproduce
transnational relations. At the same time, standards func-
tion as “fact factories”. According to Dunn, “by specify-
ing particular forms of data collection, recording, and
analysis, they act as engines for generating knowledge
about products, processes, and people” (2005, p. 184).
In the process of merging the Covenant of Mayors and
the Compact of Mayors, the question whether the stan-
dardisation ofmunicipal climate data should indeed form
the basis of the future GCoM emerged as a contested
issue. The two merging initiatives were built on differ-
ent political strategies and motives for merging. The UN-
supported Compact of Mayors has already strived to be-
come a universal representative of urban climate action
on the global scale, while the European Commission—
the initiator of the Covenant of Mayors—argued that as
a public servant, it had to work towards a single initia-
tive in order to provide clarity for the cities. The remain-
der of this article addresses the struggles over the role
of the GPC, and over the definition of a common target
for the GCoM as being facets of an unfolding controversy
regarding the politics of municipal climate data and the
future role of standardisation practices in transnational
municipal climate governance.
3.1. Towards an Accounting Framework: Struggles over
the GPC as Common Tool
The Compact of Mayors’ demand to establish the GPC
as a single standard for GCoM signatories has been a
hot topic in the negotiations (Interview Torres, 11 Oc-
tober 2016). While the GPC was eventually defined as
the official tool of the GCoM, the Covenant of Mayors’
signatories continue to use their own established meth-
ods (CoM, 2016a), as doubts still remain regarding com-
patibility (I. Gheorghe, personal communication, 5 April
2017). For cities that have already conducted emission
inventories, switching to the GPC simply for the sake of
comparability would require recalculation of all existing
inventories back to the baseline year in order to keep the
internal comparison within a city intact—incurring a con-
siderable switching cost without added value (Gus, 18
August 2016). For the time being, existing commitments
to either the Covenant ofMayors or the Compact ofMay-
ors will remain valid over a two-year transition period
(GCoM, 2017).
From the side of the Covenant of Mayors, there is
also general concern that the “Bloomberg approach”
equals establishing a direct link between GHG emissions
and funding opportunities, with the intention to demon-
strate “how many emissions do we manage, and how
many funds can we get for them” (Interview Gheorghe,
28 June 2016). While municipalities need funding for cli-
mate projects, as the interview partner readily admits,
she is concerned about putting the administration of
such funds into private hands and is wary of the connec-
tion between Bloomberg’s business interests and his en-
gagement in theGCoM.While Bloomberg’s reputation as
a successful self-made businessman has been positively
drawn upon in Compact of Mayor campaigns, it does not
facilitate trust in the European context—on the contrary.
The senior European Commission representative respon-
sible for negotiating with the Compact of Mayors over
the details of the GCoM found it pivotal to prevent the
introduction of the GPC asmandatory tool for the GCoM,
stressing that “of coursewe are not going to followa com-
mercial methodology, imposed byMr Bloomberg” (Inter-
view Callestere, 4 October 2016).
These concerns are supported by the observation
that the Compact of Mayors has a history of advertis-
ing the GPC as “the protocol that private investors, na-
tional governments, and the broader global community
will be utilising to quantify, compare and aggregate the
impact of local climate action” (Compact ofMayors, n.d.).
From the perspective of the Covenant of Mayors and the
European Commission, financial investors constitute a
new class of actors that has been written into the GCoM.
GHG emission data are not only used to underline the
importance of transnational municipal climate policy vis-
à-vis national players, but also advertised as “giving in-
vestors the ability to see that the actions cities have
been taking are having lasting, verifiable, and most im-
portantly, investable impact” (GCoM, 2016a, emphasis
in original). There is concern that this means public ur-
ban climate data could be used to develop privately mar-
ketable services:
The problem with data…is that when you have data,
you can manage the data, you can trade data….And
one of the major objectives of Mr Bloomberg
is…financial data. And now he would like to have, and
he’s not hiding it, something huge on public procure-
ment data…if you are able, with a good algorithm, to
manage public data…on the planned investments of
a high number of cities in the next years, you can
inform very powerful companies all over the world
on the public procurement prospects. You can give
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them precious information that is going to help them
to device their deeds, their public-private investment
schemes….And this is a big business, if people would
pay for that. (Interview Callestere, 4 October 2016)
This statement describes irritation over the re-shuffling
of public-private boundaries taking place under the con-
ditions of the GCoM. Concern regarding the possibility
of public information being turned into a commodity is
underlined by the Covenant of Mayors’ understanding
of transnational municipal climate policy, which stresses
the need to respect existing local political processes and
account for the distribution of power over different exist-
ing levels of governance:
Cities, all over the world…have partial competences.
So data is not so important because you don’t know
if this data refers to the geographical space in which
the city has a partial competence, or to the compe-
tences of the city…it’s very important also to under-
stand how the countries are structured, who can do
what. This is for me far more important than data. (In-
terview Callestere, 4 October 2016)
Callestere eventually brings forward these doubts regard-
ing data management by advocating for the Covenant
of Mayors to remain a separate entity within the GCoM.
While the data concerned here might not be particularly
sensitive, the commissioner has voiced his clear opposi-
tion to the idea of turning publicly sourced data into a
tradable commodity, which he understands as being “a
transfer of power, a transfer of information”. From his
point of view, the dominant role of municipal climate
data in the formation of the GCoM in general amounts
to a fundamental shift from a political to an account-
ing framework:
For me, at the time [when the merger was first dis-
cussed], data was something that was not the crucial
thing…for me, the important thing was the political
commitment to build trust, between the cities, and
the other subnational institutions on this. It was a
very political approach….This has been…changed by
an…approach very much based up on collection of
data, and management of data. (Interview Callestere,
4 October 2016)
Concluding from this statement, the shifting politics of
municipal climate data can be said to play an absolutely
central role in the negotiations and the ensuing conflict
over the formation of the GCoM.
3.2. An Alternative Political Framework: Defining a
Common Target
While the Compact of Mayors has promoted the intro-
duction of the GPC as the common GCoM tool, the
Covenant ofMayors has instead advocated the definition
of a common target. The European Commission repre-
sentative explains that he had originally suggested defin-
ing a strict common long-term target for all GCoMmem-
bers. He frames this proposal in terms of reaching cli-
mate justice:
That was for me the most important thing, to have
something that is shared in the very long-term basis,
inwhich all the injustices of the past, all the historic re-
sponsibilities, are already embedded in this common
objective. And there you need to be very strict…you
need to have only one objective for everybody. Other-
wise, it doesn’t work. Because you would be perpetu-
ating the differences, [the] different political and eco-
nomic terms. (Interview Callestere, 4 October 2016)
The suggestion for there being a common target was re-
jected, and the GCoM eventually established the nation-
ally determined contributions (NDCs) pledged by nation
states under the Paris Agreement asminimum targets for
cities in their respective territories. This produces a great
variety of individual targets. For Callestere, a common
target would have been necessary to eventually achieve
climate justice and fair conditions for cities in very differ-
ent situations. On the other hand, he sees the compara-
tive data approach as counterproductive, because itmea-
sures the wrong things and directs resources away from
the most pressing issues. In his opinion, emission data is
not immediately politically relevant in Global South con-
texts, where adaptation or access to energy is of much
greater immediate importance. “How can you tell the
people in Mumbai…to use their very scarce resources in
order to produce very expensive plans that go nowhere,
with a lot of data that is important for [very few] peo-
ple”, he asks rhetorically (Interview Callestere, 4 October
2016). Carbon data alone has no effect on these further
political goals, which is why he perceives the emphasis
on GHG emissions data as a stand-in for climate action
as problematic. On a more general level, the Covenant
of Mayors defines the setting of emission goals as a po-
litical act to be approved by city councils, and not merely
a technocratic management decision (Interview Gus, 18
August 2016).
4. Conclusions
The contentious process of forming the GCoMprovides a
window into the potentially far-reaching political effects
of the “pragmatic, problem-solving approach” brought
to the global agenda of climate governance by transna-
tional climate action (Hale, 2016, p. 20). The formation
of the GCoM is evidence of a strategic moment in TCG,
characterised by the increasing recognition of municipal
climate action in the international arena, and by ongo-
ing efforts to further coordinate and standardise urban
climate action (Bulkeley, 2015). As part of this process,
standardisedmunicipal emission reporting has gained in-
creasing political power. Pushing to introduce the GPC
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as a common metric for the new network, the Compact
of Mayors has attempted to rearrange the field of TCG
around the GPC as an “obligatory passage point” (Wilm-
sen & Gesing, 2016, p. 34, following Callon, 1986). The
Covenant of Mayors, on the other hand, has refused to
accept the GPC as a common tool, instead arguing for
common long-term targets. Policy targets such as gen-
eral access to clean energy, as well as GHG emission re-
duction targets are both understood as contributions to
achieve long-term climate goals, and therefore as politi-
cally productive.
The Compact of Mayor’s focus on producing compa-
rable municipal emission data was met with concern by
the Covenant of Mayors over the potential for munici-
pal emissions becoming commodified, up for taking by
private investors. This irritation over the data approach,
and over the role of Michael R. Bloomberg as a power-
ful political and economic figure, reflects different im-
plicit understandings of how trust and political commit-
ment might be built. Two “completely different princi-
ples” (Callestere, 4 October 2016) have been at work
here, expressed in two contrasting modes of transna-
tional municipal climate policy, one relying on quantita-
tive data and individual leadership, the other building on
bottom-up, democratic legitimisation and service to the
public. The ensuing conflict goes to the heart of what
Castán Broto and Bulkeley (2013) have described as the
re-ordering of the public and the private in transnational
municipal climate policy, played out here in the strug-
gles over the role of municipal emission data. The insis-
tence on the protection of public data against private fi-
nancial interests, used as a strong argument against the
“Bloomberg approach” from the side of the European
Covenant ofMayors, can be understood as a way of pack-
aging resistance against this ongoing reshaping of the
public and private spheres.
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